Linux

There are several ways to exploit LogoFAIL. Remote attacks work by first exploiting an unpatched vulnerability in a browser, media player, or other app and using the administrative control gained to replace the legitimate logo image processed early in the boot process with an identical-looking one that exploits a parser flaw. The other way is to gain brief access to a vulnerable device while it’s unlocked and replace the legitimate image file with a malicious one.

In short, the adversary requires elevated access to replace a file on the EFI partition. In this case, you should consider the machine compromised with or without this flaw.

You weren't hoping that Secure Boot saves your ass, were you?

Fyi if someone had physical access / administration access due to another vulnerability to your machine they can exploit it, news at 11:00

Did anyone really think that making UEFI systems the equivalent of a mini OS was a good idea? Or having them be accessible to the proper OS? Was there really no pushback, when UEFI was being standardized, to say "images that an OS can write to are not critical to initializing hardware functionality, don't include that"? Was that question not asked for every single piece of functionality in the standard?

I've never been a fan of the UEFI logo inserting itself into the boot screen. It's basically just an advertisement for the hardware vendor because they're jealous of the OS having the spotlight. And it's an ad that, like so many other ads before it, screws over the security and privacy of the advertisee because fuck you that's why.

I can’t believe stupid, pointless marketing crap didn’t have the best of the best working to ensure security.

As its name suggests, LogoFAIL involves logos, specifically those of the hardware seller that are displayed on the device screen early in the boot process, while the UEFI is still running. Image parsers in UEFIs from all three major IBVs are riddled with roughly a dozen critical vulnerabilities that have gone unnoticed until now. By replacing the legitimate logo images with identical-looking ones that have been specially crafted to exploit these bugs, LogoFAIL makes it possible to execute malicious code at the most sensitive stage of the boot process, which is known as DXE, short for Driver Execution Environment.

So, does disabling the boot logo prevent the attack, or would it only make the attack obvious?

As its name suggests, LogoFAIL involves logos, specifically those of the hardware seller that are displayed on the device screen early in the boot process, while the UEFI is still running.

Me using an old PC with BIOS instead of UEFI: 😏

It's rare that I get to feel anything remotely comforting about not being able to afford new hardware, but if I understand correctly, my BIOS-only dinosaur can't be exploited.

Still vulnerable to thousands of other exploits no doubt, but not this one.

Hello I am writing the firmware for MotherBoard 2021, a definitely completely different product than MotherBoard 2020, I am going to ship in in 2 weeks for Christmas, and I am going to write an image decoder on top of bare metal, and it is "not" going to let you hack the pants off the computer.

Said no one ever.

The article didn't mention this, but would disabling the UEFI logo in the boot screen mitigate the vulnerability until proper patches get rolled out? (Or honestly at this point, I'd keep it disabled even after it's patched in case they didn't patch it right. UEFI's are all proprietary so it's not like you can check.) Since the vulnerability is in the image parser, would bypassing that be enough?

Do they even let you disable it?

So this is only for the background of the motherboard boot up logo like from Asus, Acer, Gigabyte ect? Not your grub or rEFInd background correct?

We need more machines that support coreboot. These proprietary firmware vendors have been getting rich off making our machines worse for too long.

I wonder if this effects coreboot builds like heads as they allow you to use external devices like a nitrokey for verification when you boot

I may be wrong, but does it mean that if someone is able to modify my uefi - they would be able to inject virus in booting image?

So, does this affect dual boot systems, if e.g. Windows is compromised, now that malware in the efi partition can compromise the Linux system next time it boots? Yikes!

I suppose in principle malware from one OS can attack the other anyway, even if the other is fully encrypted and/or the first OS doesn't have drivers for the second's filesystems: because malware can install said drivers and attack at least the bootloader - though that night have been protected by secure boot if it weren't for this new exploit?

On Linux/Mac you have no use sudo. For sudo you need a password.

This thing will make it very easy to make a rubber ducky though.

I wonder if old BIOS are vulnerable...

is it common practice to have a web browser or media player running with elevated permissions? seems like a strange thing to do...

So I don't get it, I have my entire boot image in a signed EFI binary, the logo is in there as well. I don't think I'm susceptible to this, right? I don't think systemd-boot or the kernel reads an unsigned logo file anywhere. (Using secure boot)

This is the best summary I could come up with:

Hundreds of Windows and Linux computer models from virtually all hardware makers are vulnerable to a new attack that executes malicious firmware early in the boot-up sequence, a feat that allows infections that are nearly impossible to detect or remove using current defense mechanisms.

The attack—dubbed LogoFAIL by the researchers who devised it—is notable for the relative ease in carrying it out, the breadth of both consumer- and enterprise-grade models that are susceptible, and the high level of control it gains over them.

LogoFAIL is a constellation of two dozen newly discovered vulnerabilities that have lurked for years, if not decades, in Unified Extensible Firmware Interfaces responsible for booting modern devices that run Windows or Linux.

The participating companies comprise nearly the entirety of the x64 and ARM CPU ecosystem, starting with UEFI suppliers AMI, Insyde, and Phoenix (sometimes still called IBVs or independent BIOS vendors); device manufacturers such as Lenovo, Dell, and HP; and the makers of the CPUs that go inside the devices, usually Intel, AMD or designers of ARM CPUs.

As its name suggests, LogoFAIL involves logos, specifically those of the hardware seller that are displayed on the device screen early in the boot process, while the UEFI is still running.

LogoFAIL is a newly discovered set of high-impact security vulnerabilities affecting different image parsing libraries used in the system firmware by various vendors during the device boot process.

The original article contains 663 words, the summary contains 232 words. Saved 65%. I'm a bot and I'm open source!

Is this potentially useful to me? Since it is persistent, can I use it on this motherboard I have over here that insists on using UEFI even if I do not want to?