There are no ethical choices under first-past-the-post voting. We must instead make a decision that reduces the most harm.
this post was submitted on 05 May 2024
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:::spoiler I can provide one, and I'll also say, I've never seen a logical response to this argument, beyond drive-by downvotes.
Voters have something politicians want (votes) and politicians have something voters want (the ability to set policy). That means that there's a negotiation to be had. And the worst thing you can do in a negotiation is to say that you'll unconditionally agree to whatever terms the other side offers.
To use an example, there's a game/social experiment called "The Ultimatum Game." In it, the first player offers the second player an offer on how to split $100, and the second player chooses to accept or deny the offer. If both players behave as rational, "homo economicus" the result will be that player 1 offers a $99-$1 split. But in practice, most second players will reject offers beyond a certain point, usually around $70-$30, and most first players will offer more even splits because of that possibility. The only reason that the $99-$1 case is "rational" is because it's a one-off interaction. There is a cost associated with accepting such a deal, and that cost is that you've established yourself as a pushover for all future interactions, and there is no reason that anyone would offer you more than $1 if the game were repeated.
In the same way, an organized political faction that can credibly threaten to withhold support unless a baseline of demands are met will have more political leverage compared to a faction that unconditionally supports the "lesser evil." If a politician only needs to be marginally less bad than the alternative to win your vote, then they have no incentive to be more than marginally less bad. It's the same way that if you know the second player will act rationally, you can get away with only offering them $1 because $1>$0. Declaring a minimum baseline and sticking to it is a valid political strategy, in the same way "I won't accept less than $30, even if it means I get nothing" is a valid game strategy.
Whether you think that applies in this particular case is another question, but if you were looking for an logical explanation of the reasoning, there it is.
If this was what you were presenting this as (a logical response to the argument above) then it shouldn't be another question. It should apply directly to this argument.
Your comment only applies to a negotiation between 2 parties and doesn't address the actual problem at hand whatsoever. So yeah, its not a logical response to the above argument at all.
It establishes the logical framework for the opposing case. Making the opposing case requires additional assumptions, such as, where your minimum requirements ought to be set, exactly how good/bad Biden is, etc. Those would be tangents that I don't really want to get sidetracked by, because my goal was just to establish the logical framework for the opposing case. My comment was long enough as it is, and I've frequently had comments that long been (rudely) dismissed as being too long. My purpose for that comment is not to persuade but to explain.
It certainly does not establish "the logical framework" for the opposing case. Again, as I explained, the framework deals with 2 parties negotiating, which is not applicable to the argument presented.
You haven't provided any reason why the situations aren't comparable. If you introduce more parties, it doesn't change the dynamics of the situation.
Because the parties you established are the voter, and the party asking for votes. Those are not the parties presented in the original argument.
Of course it does.
That's called an analogy.
No it doesn't.
Not when it isn't analogous to the situation presented. Which yours is not.
Prove it.
Prove it's not. You're the one claiming that the distinction makes it not analogous. I don't know why you think that would change it so it's impossible for me to address your reasons.
That's not at all how the burden of proof works.
You're leaping to the assumption that the scenario you provided is even analogous to the one you replied to. It isn't. You need to start by proving that it is.
It's not a valid political strategy if you never account for losing your own money. It's not $30 or nothing. It's $30 or I file bankruptcy and have all my possessions taken away from me.
Missing out on $30 vs losing $30 (or $300, or $3000, etc) doesn't change the dynamics of the situation.
It does.
Maybe for someone who has nothing to lose it doesn't.
We call that privilege.
The stakes can change your risk-benefit assessment, but the fundamental dynamics are the same. Even if there's a gun to my head, there are limits to what deal I'll accept. "Kill another captive and I'll let you live five more minutes," for example.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-sum_game
I know what a zero-sum game is, but I don't see how it's relevant to this conversation.
Guess you lose two health bars? Seems like you presented the wrong evidence.
wait, having nothing to lose is privilege? I thought it was generally the other way around
but have you considered: what if I drain you of twelve gorillion dollars, or give you nothing, and that's the negotiation? what then? have you considered that: what if I just like heedlessly extend the metaphor to the current political state of affairs in such a way that it reinforces my own biases and points, what then, what would you do then? surely, the logic doesn't hold up if I tell you that the alternative is horrible, right?
wait, you're telling me the logic does hold up still in that instance? how about no? have you considered what if I just said no, to that? what if I just denied the logic and decided to be obstinate, what then? what if actually, I like eating shit, huh?