this post was submitted on 27 Nov 2024
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“Whether a proof of concept or not, Bootkitty marks an interesting move forward in the UEFI threat landscape, breaking the belief about modern UEFI bootkits being Windows-exclusive threats,” ESET researchers wrote. “Even though the current version from VirusTotal does not, at the moment, represent a real threat to the majority of Linux systems, it emphasizes the necessity of being prepared for potential future threats.”

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[–] [email protected] 74 points 2 weeks ago* (last edited 2 weeks ago) (4 children)

The Bootkitty sample ESET found is unable to override a defense, known as UEFI Secure Boot, that uses cryptographic signatures to ensure that each piece of software loaded during startup is trusted by a computer's manufacturer.

AKA not that big of a deal, yet. An article from another post about this also mentions GRUB explicitly as a requirement as well as PoC using self signed keys, which renders it sort of impossible to abuse.

UKI + your own keys + secure boot is still not broken.

[–] [email protected] 54 points 2 weeks ago (5 children)

Unfortunately a lot of people in the Linux world still hate secure boot because they associate it with locking your PC to only running windows. Never mind the fact that basically every big Linux distro plays nicely with secure boot these days, and has for a while now.

[–] [email protected] 36 points 2 weeks ago (3 children)

I associate it with the fight I've had every single time I tried to use it. It's never been a smooth process on any server I attempted to use it on. Usually I either run into problems with a system not wanting to properly boot the memory stick even with a full UEFI image flashed to it, or if I do get that to work I go through the whole installation process only to find the system unbootable for whatever reason. Eventually I just give up and do a standard installation because why should I have to work this hard to put an OS on a machine?

[–] [email protected] 15 points 2 weeks ago

I actually had a system that wouldn't initiate the video card because of secure boot and many other problems with over the years that I repaired them for a living. Left a very bad taste in my mouth but if it's actually improving I'll it again.

[–] [email protected] 5 points 2 weeks ago (1 children)

It is a system one has to understand fully, i.e. not like ssh, where you can understand connecting to a remote host without bothering about key pairs, x11 forwading, etc.

I was lucky enough to have figured out Gentoo enough where plugging in secure boot was just extending my own system update script. Admittedly, I don't know how much other distros fight back.

[–] [email protected] 7 points 2 weeks ago (1 children)

I'm on Debian, they've been providing UEFI images for a number of years so everything should "just work". In fact I have one server where things did just work and that's the only system using UEFI. Two other servers of the same model and BIOS version completely failed after numerous attempts so I finally said screw it and just did a normal install.

[–] [email protected] 2 points 2 weeks ago (1 children)

Do you know how that works? Is it something like Ubuntu where Canonical uses some sort of chain from Microsoft or do you have to embed the cert they provide into UEFI yourself?

[–] [email protected] 2 points 2 weeks ago

Sorry, I really haven't a clue. I just know once in awhile it does work, but usually it fails for me.

[–] 9tr6gyp3 1 points 2 weeks ago (1 children)
[–] [email protected] 1 points 2 weeks ago (1 children)

Shouldn't this all be handled automatically by the Debian installer though? It seems weird that I would ever have to run other tools just to install a brand new system.

[–] 9tr6gyp3 1 points 2 weeks ago

Oh yeah Debian has their own documentation for SecureBoot. If thats not working though, check out sbctl.

[–] [email protected] 19 points 2 weeks ago (1 children)

because they associate it with locking your PC to only running windows.

They're not exactly wrong. BIOS/UEFI bugs that make it a royal pain to use secure boot with anything but Windows are pretty common.

[–] [email protected] 10 points 2 weeks ago (1 children)

And many mainboards also suck in this regard. On mine, I can set secure boot mode to either 'Windows OS' (which means secure boot on) or 'Other OS' (which means secure boot is off). Took me a couple hours to figure that out

[–] [email protected] 1 points 2 weeks ago

Can confirm. I've seen this on multiple boards. I think this was Asus nomenclature.

[–] mlg 11 points 2 weeks ago

The Fedora doc on this is a bit old but it's still mostly the same:

Secure boot activates a lock-down mode in the Linux kernel which disables various features kernel functionality:

  • Loading kernel modules that are not signed by a trusted key.
  • Using kexec to load an unsigned kernel image.
  • Hibernation and resume from hibernation.
  • User-space access to physical memory and I/O ports.
  • Module parameters that allow setting memory and I/O port addresses.
  • Writing to MSRs through /dev/cpu/*/msr.
  • Use of custom ACPI methods and tables.

The implementation of secure boot is still questionable to this day, but it is understandable that it doesn't always play nice with Linux. I do believe you can use hibernate now as long as you have an encrypted swap (LUKS).

I can definitely see the pain if you happen to be a kernel dev or use linux on any SBC with IO ports you want to mess with in userspace and not make en entire overkill kernel module for.

[–] [email protected] 7 points 2 weeks ago* (last edited 2 weeks ago)

Yea, I guess that initial total lack of understanding and big headlines has left a long-lasting scar. Admittedly, secure boot could be used to lock a machine down if the ability to turn it off and/or manage the keys yourself was removed.

We'll get there, eventually :)

[–] [email protected] 5 points 2 weeks ago

Never mind the fact that basically every big Linux distro plays nicely with secure boot these days, and has for a while now.

In my experience nicely is still pretty relative. It still seems to be the most common area things go wrong on my installs and place I have the hardest time working around...

and the bigger part, it's a solution to a problem that I've never seen happen in the wild, and really can't fathom happening on linux that doesn't involve a very dumb user running software from an unknown source as root.

[–] [email protected] 5 points 2 weeks ago (1 children)

Well... if you have your own keys (like I do) you have to store them somewhere. That somewhere is probably somewhere on a computer where they are used so you can update the kernel. If you have private keys, you can probably bypass secure boot.

Is there a way to have private keys stored on a nitrokey that has to be plugged in for every kernel update?

[–] [email protected] 8 points 2 weeks ago (1 children)

Yes, failing to safeguard keys is fatal, but that applies to everything. But if fs you're storing keys on is behind luks and they're readable by root only - you're as safe enough. There're also LSMs like selinux that can increase the complexity of attack.

I don't know about nitrokey specifically, but TPM is an option (not good enough, imo) and a simple luks encrypted usb. You could get some convenience by storing the key to unlock it somewhere on the encrypted root.

In general - you cannot stop a targeted attack no matter what, but staying safe from all the automated ones is doable.

[–] [email protected] 1 points 2 weeks ago

They are stored behind luks and I think they are readable only by root. But bootkit can probably only infect UEFI from Linux that is running on that machine. And to interact to UEFI you probably have to be root, right?

I'll look into more options, either store keys on a seperate luks usb key or on a hardware securety key like Nitrokey. For sbctl there is already a roadmap feature for hardware security keys, I hope this comes soon :)

[–] CriticalMiss 4 points 2 weeks ago (1 children)

How many distros support secure boot out of the box? IIRC it’s only Ubuntu and RHEL. The rest require hacking some shit together with self signed keys.

[–] [email protected] 2 points 2 weeks ago (2 children)

Don't know, been rolling with Gentoo for some time now.

I wouldn't trust "out of the box" support anyway as that would imply trusting microsoft keys.

[–] raldone01 2 points 2 weeks ago* (last edited 2 weeks ago)

It is so annoying that one can't ditch m$ keys and still boot windows. Sure you can sign the windows bootloader with your own keys. However it checks its own signature and just refuses to boot.

If anyone has a solution let me know.

[–] CriticalMiss 1 points 2 weeks ago

I checked my store and there are Canonical keys there, but I don’t think that’s on every computer.

[–] [email protected] 2 points 2 weeks ago (1 children)

This sounds like a good thing. I don't care if the manufacturer of my equipment trusts the software. I care if I trust it.

[–] [email protected] 1 points 2 weeks ago

It is a good thing!