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Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, who last month brokered a deal to end an armed mutiny in Russia, said on Thursday that Russian mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin was no longer in Belarus.

Lukashenko said on June 27 that Prigozhin, leader of the Wagner Group whose fighters briefly captured a southern Russian city and marched towards Moscow, had arrived in Belarus as part of the June 24 deal that defused the crisis.

But Lukashenko told reporters on Thursday: "As for Prigozhin, he's in St Petersburg (Russia's second biggest city). He is not on the territory of Belarus."

A business jet linked to Prigozhin left St Petersburg for Moscow on Wednesday and was heading for southern Russia on Thursday, according to flight tracking data, but it was not clear if the mercenary chief was on board.

Lukashenko said an offer for Wagner to station some of its fighters in Belarus - a prospect that has alarmed neighbouring NATO countries - still stands.

He said he did not see it as a risk to Belarus and did not believe Wagner fighters would ever take up arms against his country.

Lukashenko has spoken proudly of his role in ending the armed mutiny, which Russian President Vladimir Putin has said could have plunged Russia into civil war. Last week Lukashenko said he had persuaded Putin not to "wipe out" Prigozhin.

But much remains unclear about the terms of the deal Lukashenko brokered, and whether it is being implemented as agreed.

Russian state TV on Wednesday launched a fierce attack on Prigozhin and said an investigation into what had happened was still being vigorously pursued.

Military formations drawn from across Russia are currently bearing the brunt of Ukraine’s counter offensive.

In Zaporizhzhia Oblast, the 58th Combined Arms Army is defending heavily entrenched lines; normally it secures Russia’s volatile Caucasus region. Around Velyka Novosilka, the 5th Combined Arms Army and Naval Infantry hold the front; they are routinely based 7000km away as a balance to Chinese power.

Around Bakhmut, the defence is now largely formed around airborne regiments normally stationed in western Russia, who normally act as an elite rapid reaction force in case of tensions with NATO. The way Russia is accepting risks across Eurasia highlights how the war has dislocated Russia’s established national strategy.

General Sergei Surovikin, Commander-in-Chief Russian Aerospace Forces and deputy commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, has not been seen in public since the 23-24 June 2023 Wagner Group mutiny. Meanwhile, Deputy Defence Minister Colonel General Yunus-bek Yevkurov was notably absent from a televised appearance by the Ministry of Defence’s leadership on 03 July 2023.

Reports of Surovikin’s arrest cannot be confirmed, but authorities will likely be suspicious of his long association with Wagner dating back to his service in Syria from 2017.Similarly, Yevkurov was filmed talking to Wagner owner Yevgeny Prigozhin during the group’s uncontested take-over of Rostov-on-Don.

Although largely known in the West by his brutal reputation, Surovikin is one of the more respected senior officers within the Russian military; any official sanction against him is likely to be divisive. The suspicion that has potentially fallen on senior serving officers highlights how Prigozhin's abortive insurrection has worsened existing fault lines within Russia's national security community.

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 05.07.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 231700 (+670) people were liquidated,
• tanks - 4062 (+3) units
• armored personnel carriers - 7917 (+9) units
• artillery systems - 4288 (+36) units,
• MLRS - 656 (+9) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 395 (+1) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 309 (+0) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 3614 (+12),
• cruise missiles - 1264 (+0),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 6865 (+22) units,
• special equipment - 598 (+8).

In recent weeks, Russia has prioritised and refined tactics aimed at slowing Ukrainian armoured counter-offensive operations in southern Ukraine.

The core of this approach has been Russia’s very heavy use of anti-tank mines. In some areas the density of its minefields indicate that it has likely used many more mines than laid down in its military doctrine.

Having slowed the Ukrainian advance, Russia has then attempted to strike Ukrainian armoured vehicles with one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles, attack helicopters and artillery.

Although Russia has achieved some success with this approach in the early stages of Ukraine’s counter-offensive, its forces continue to suffer from key weaknesses, especially overstretched units and a shortage of artillery munitions.

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 04.07.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 231030 (+770) people were liquidated,
• tanks - 4059 (+2) units
• APVs - 7908 (+9) units
• artillery systems - 4252 (+32) units,
• MLRS - 647 (+6) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 394 (+3) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 309 (+0) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 3602 (+29),
• cruise missiles - 1264 (+0),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 6843 (+9) units,
• special equipment - 590 (+0).

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Russia has cancelled the 2023 iteration of MAKS, its premier international air show. Scheduled every other year, MAKS takes place near Moscow and showcases Russia's civil and military aerospace sectors and has become key to securing export customers.

The show has probably been cancelled largely due to genuine security concerns, following recent uncrewed aerial vehicle attacks inside Russia. Organisers were highly likely also aware of the potential for reputational damage if fewer international delegations attended.

The war has been exceptionally challenging for Russia's aerospace community. The sector is struggling under international sanctions; highly trained specialists are being encouraged to serve as infantry in the Roscosmos space agency's own militia. Meanwhile, Commander in Chief of the Aerospace Forces, General Sergei Surovikin, has not been seen in public since the abortive mutiny by Wagner Group, for whom he served as point of contact with the Russian Ministry of Defence.

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 02.07.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 229660 (+790) people were liquidated,
• tanks - 4052 (+10) units
• APVs - 7888 (+20) units
• artillery systems - 4188 (+26) units,
• MLRS - 637 (+5) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 390 (+1) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 308 (+0) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 3557 (+12),
• cruise missiles - 1261 (+0),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 6816 (+22) units,
• special equipment - 583 (+3).

Since around 23 June 2023, Ukrainian forces have almost certainly restarted deploying personnel to the east bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast, near the ruined Antonovskiy Bridge.

Fighting intensified on the east bank from 27 June 2023. The defending Russian force includes elements of Russia’s 7th Guards Air Assault Division, part of the Dnipro Group of Forces (DGF).

In recent weeks, Russia has highly likely reallocated elements of DGF defending the bank of the Dnipro to reinforce the Zaporizhzhia sector.

Combat around the bridge head is almost certainly complicated by the flooding, destruction and residual mud from the collapse of the Kakhovka Dam on 06 June 2023.

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In a June 2023 report, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) assessed that Russia’s military spending budget for 2023 is around 6.6 trillion rubles (USD $85.8bn).

In addition, Russia almost certainly faces extra direct budgetary defence costs due to the war, including security expenses in the occupied regions and defensive measures in regions bordering Ukraine.

Russia’s true military expenditure remains uncertain due to a lack of transparency, including the use of classified budget lines, which account for approximately 22 per cent of the Russian Government’s total budget.

This equates to about 4.4 per cent of Russian GDP compared with 3.6 per cent in 2021, before the invasion of Ukraine.

Although only part of the defence budget is spent on the war in Ukraine, the increase in spending highlights the cost of Russia’s activity in Ukraine.