JokerProof
He didn't shoot himself because he thought that was the "smart move", he did it out of pain and despair. Some just lack basic human compassion.
Le parquet n'est pas le défenseur de l'accusation.
The article is actually pretty balanced. Yes Proton is secure and private, but if you're hiding from law enforcement, don't expect a third party to take the fall for you.
The number of killed russians is given 3 times, and each time it's a different number. Is it 46, 24 or 18 killed?
Edit : i misread.
Ah mais en même temps ?! Non, j'ai toujours fait l'un puis l'autre.
Le post ne manque pas d'ironie, ceux qui sont "devant les écrans " étaient présents in situ, sur les champs. A l'inverse de celui qui formule la critique ?
They're cleary aware there's drones above, yes. They seems exhausted, we don't know for how long they're under attack but fatigue plays it's role. They also don't have any counter-measure, and are not trained to act a certain way.
Without good fortifications hiding you from the enemy sight, there's actually not much you can do to protect yourself. At some point it's just every man for himself. You can always give away your mate position, as we can see here, it only works for a brief moment.
Je suis d'accord, d'où la bonne décision. Je pense que c'est également et surtout une tentative de contre-feu visant à reléguer le "Tahiti-gate" au second plan de son actualité.
Bonne décision prise pour les mauvaises raisons AMHA.
On gagnerait à différencier le "testament" politique d'une vie publique ; et la mort d'un homme qui laisse derrière lui une famille éplorée.
On peut opposer des arguments au premier, mais j'ai du mal à voir le second comme autre chose qu'un manque d'empathie sacrément morbide.
It's the dead of the night, but they still don't hear the drone, must be silent AF.
An apparently leaked memo attributed to former Russian minister Dmitri Rogozin reports major shortcomings in the Russian army's equipment, including artillery far inferior to Western equivalents, a shortage of 152 mm shells, inadequate communications and obsolete UAVs.
The VChK-OGPU Telegram channel has published 4 pages of a memo signed in Rogozin's name and addressed to Anton Vaino, the head of the Russian Presidential Administration. It tackles "problematic issues of organisation and management of combat operations" in the war in Ukraine.
Rogozin served as deputy prime minister in charge of the defence industry from 2011 to 2018, then as head of the Russian space agency Roscosmos until being fired in July 2022. He has since been trying to make himself relevant again, which is likely the context for the memo.
Rogozin declared himself the head of the "Tsar's Wolves" inspection group of volunteers, with the stated aim of testing and supplying weapons for Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Assuming the memo is genuine, it likely reflects his discussions with those involved in procurement.
He writes that he has been in "consultations with a number of military commanders in the zone of the Special Military Operation (SMO) general designers of weapons and military equipment as well as on the basis of the experience I have acquired over the past nine months".
These discussions have led him to identify "4 key issues, on the solution of which the success of the Special Military Operation (SMO) largely depends."
1/ The first category is "Organisation and conduct of counter-battery warfare", in which he says that Russian counter-battery radars cannot detect long-range Western-supplied artillery and Russian artillery batteries don't have the range to fire back. Specifically:
a) Obsolete artillery reconnaissance means of the Zoopark radar, ACP, AZK in terms of range do not correspond to the technical characteristics of the enemy's artillery systems: M777, "Paladin", "Krab", and all the more so "MLRS", "MARS";
b) the absence of counter-battery firepower from the combined barrel artillery at the firing range of Western artillery systems. The use of only long-range 152 mm shells (of which there is an acute shortage). Often the use of BM-21 and Uragan missiles, the accuracy of which is negligible; Consideration is currently being given to the establishment of separate teams in each regiment (brigade) using [DJI] Matrice 300 quadrocopters ..."
[Here there is apparently a missing page covering issue 2.]
3/ On the next extant page, the author discusses problems with radio communications systems, focusing on the new but problematic Azart system that the Russian military introduced in the 2010s and the lack of other modern communications equipment.
He writes that there is "[a lack of?] stability, secrecy and promptness of the transfer of official information, and under certain conditions, a complete loss of communication." Specifically, he notes of the Azart:
(a) ... The technical specifications do not correspond to the declared data, there is no base radio station, retransmission is possible only through the same radio station, arranged as a repeater. So, in a brigade (regiment), to create the smallest system of communication in defence, you need to put at least 20 radios as repeaters. Communication in the PPRCh mode [frequency-hopping spread spectrum] with armoured vehicles is impossible due to the absence of this mode on standard weapons stations;
b) Tanks, self-propelled artillery and armoured vehicles are equipped with communications equipment of the last generation, operating in the open mode and exposed to the effects of electronic warfare. In order to organise stable communications, additional vehicle radios of the "Hitera", "Motorola", "Kombat", "Kirosan" types are installed, which only partially solve the problem of command and control;
c) The arrival of diverse means of radio communication for the troops has led to re-sorting and lack of compatibility, [it is impossible to] organise interaction in combat, both in the connection (unit) and with neighbours. Even though the Azart radios are inadequate, the troops do not have enough of them;
d) Space (satellite) communication facilities are necessary up to and including battalion level, as well as in reconnaissance, artillery and air defence units;
e) The supply of Arakhis-2, Argon and Granit communications equipment, which have already proved to be highly effective, is carried out in minimal quantities. There are no company or battalion sets of radios in this inventory, especially for armoured vehicles. These types of radios are more often most commonly used by special operations and reconnaissance units."
4/ In the next section, the author discusses "Reconnaissance organisation issues", by which he means aerial reconnaissance using UAVs. He highlights critical problems with the capabilities and quantities of Russia's UAVs:
a) ... At the tactical and operational level, the main means of obtaining firing coordinates of troops and enemy facilities at a depth of 3 to 60 kilometres are UAVs of various types.
b) The types of UAVs adopted into service before the beginning of the Special Military Operation (SMO) are outdated and ineffective, and their video and photo equipment does not provide the required resolution and image clarity. These are such types as Orlan-10, Granat, Tachyon, and Aileron. These UAVs are not immune from enemy electronic warfare, and because of this, there are large losses in the course of their use. The previously used devices of the "Kometa" type have not been finalised.
The new models - more jamming-proof and with better optical equipment, such as "Zala", "Supercam" (the cost of one device is about 25 million rubles [$264,000]) and others, cannot yet cover the need of the troops during the course of the SMO.
Among other things, the issue of training specialists for these types of UAVs has not been fully resolved.
"While we are still getting ready for the use of the Supercam in the zone of the SMO in cooperation with the manufacturer's representatives, the Zala requires a trip to the territory of the Russian Federation for a period of up to 3 weeks.
"In regular UAV units, 10-30% of the total number of aircraft are available (taking into account combat losses). Every aircraft is accounted for.
"Despite improvements in the quality of UAV optics and technical parameters of the complexes, the issues of countering the enemy's electronic defence systems have not been resolved.
"There is no proper feedback from the Russian Ministry of Defence to industry and leading state design bureaus.
"Nevertheless, the issues of organizing direct dialogue between the troops and industry, including private engineering companies, are solvable and require only will and organization of efforts." /end
Wagner PMC mercenary Denis Kuzmin was headed home to Omsk across Russia but stopped in Moscow and hired prostitutes in a banya (sauna). After he passed out, the prostitutes stole 790,000 rubles ($8,500) in cash, his entire salary for serving in Ukraine for 6 months.
The chart below shows how control of the country has developed over the course of the war.
Prior to the invasion on 24th February 2022, Russia occupied approximately 7.04% of Ukraine.
Subsequently, Russia has expanded its occupation to an additional 10.46% of Ukraine.
Polish radars failed to detect the 2 Belarusian military helicopters that violated Polish air space in Białowieża due to their low altitude. They flew 3km into Poland.
Statement by the Polish Ministry of National Defense
More info:
🔴The Ministry of National Defense of Poland has issued a statement regarding the current situation on the Polish-Belarusian border. Here's a detailed breakdown:
1️⃣ Meeting of the Committee : Mariusz Błaszczak, the Minister of National Defense and Chairman of the Committee for National Security and Defense Affairs, convened a meeting of the Committee to clarify the current situation on the Polish-Belarusian border.
2️⃣ Violation of Airspace : On August 1, 2023, two Belarusian helicopters violated Polish airspace while conducting training near the border. The Belarusian side had previously informed the Polish side about the training. The violation occurred in the Białowieża area at a very low altitude, which made it difficult to detect by radar systems. Therefore, in the morning statement, the Operational Command of the Armed Forces reported that Polish radar systems did not record a violation of Polish airspace.
3️⃣ Increase in Border Security : Mariusz Błaszczak ordered an increase in the number of soldiers on the border and the allocation of additional forces and resources, including combat helicopters.
4️⃣ NATO Informed : The incident was reported to NATO.
5️⃣ Belarusian Diplomat Summoned : The Belarusian charge d’affaires will be summoned to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to explain the incident.
6️⃣ Hybrid Actions : The Committee reminded that Russia and Belarus have intensified hybrid actions against Poland recently.
7️⃣ Appeal for Responsible Information Sharing : Due to possible further provocations, the Committee appealed for responsible dissemination and commenting on information that could be used by the Russian and Belarusian regime.
Militarnyi reports that yesterday, three civilian ships (Israelian, Greek and Turkish/Georgian origin) were able to bypass the Russian blockade of the Black Sea and headed for Ukraine. It is reported that the passage was secured by a US P8 anti-ship aircraft.
