My summary, listening through the podcast for people who want text instead:
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Mike: Past two weeks or so, in the north near Kupiansk, things have
mostly stabilized; Russia has not made significant progress there or
near Kreminna. Ukrainian forces still trying to take remainder of
Klishchiivka, south of Bakhmut. That fight has dragged on, progress
has been slow. Velyka Novosilka axis had been dormant for some
time, but Ukraine has been reapplying some limited pressure to
Russian forces there. -
The main axis of advance in southern Zaporizhzhia from Orikhiv.
Ukrainian forces have been making advances through heavy
fortifications and defenses, tunnels. First Russian line of defense
was stronger than had been expected by open-source analysts; is main
line of defense. Russia has been pressed back behind that main
line, now trying to defend town of Verbove and moving to positions
along second line. -
Q: Is this a breakthrough? A penetration? A: In last few weeks,
Ukrainian forces have picked up momentum. The extent to which they
have been able to degrade Russian forces and Russian lines has had
an effect. Both Ukraine and Russia making use of reserves; comes
down to who is going to make better use of them. Ukrainian forces
have had infantry push through first Russian line and are currently
widening breach to secure against flank attacks. Probably not
possible for Ukrainian forces to push south without taking town of
Verbove, which would be on their flank. Russia has rotated in 76th
airborne units, rotated out motor rifle units that had held areas.
Probably best described as a breach. Not best described as a
breakthrough, because that requires exploitation, ability to move
vehicles through. -
Q: Has offensive been successful? A: Narratives have been shifting.
At first, was very pessimistic one, now some assessments seem more
positive. Ukrainian approach has clearly achieved some results,
however, Russian military does not seem to be pressured enough to be
at risk of collapse. Russian military not that confident about
being able to hold with units that they have. Many unknowns that we
cannot see on battlefield. Main constraints on offensive are
remaining combat strength and remaining artillery munitions, and
weather. Weather may get worse around end of October or so. Not
clear how long offensive will run; could continue into winter.
Still too early to say result of offensive. -
Q: How was your earlier piece, Perseverance and Adaptation: Ukraine’s Counteroffensive at Three Months
received? A: Was received well. RUSI also put out piece same
morning, Stormbreak: Fighting Through Russian Defences in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive,
which came to similar conclusions despite not reviewing each other's
works. RUSI report focused on Velyka Novosilka axis, Kofman and Lee
focused on Orikhiv and Bakhmut. Similar conclusions on Russian
adaptations and Ukrainian challenges, how action was conducted, how
Western training needs to change. Similar ideas on what Ukrainian
forces need. Kofman feels that this is about as much validation as
can reasonably do, given the state of the war and information at
this point. -
Q: You proposed not bringing in new weapons so much as bringing in
weapons already being brought in, faster and sooner. Could you
expand on this? A: I focused on scaling up training, doing it
sooner so there are more than 3-4 months. Need to line up with
supporting capabilities and planning for future offensive starting
sooner than was done for current offensive.
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