this post was submitted on 13 Sep 2023
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Nick Danforth sat down with Mike Kofman to discuss the state of the Ukrainian offensive three months in, as well as the challenges of assessing it.

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[–] [email protected] 4 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago) (1 children)

My summary, listening through the podcast for people who want text instead:

  • Mike: Past two weeks or so, in the north near Kupiansk, things have
    mostly stabilized; Russia has not made significant progress there or
    near Kreminna. Ukrainian forces still trying to take remainder of
    Klishchiivka, south of Bakhmut. That fight has dragged on, progress
    has been slow. Velyka Novosilka axis had been dormant for some
    time, but Ukraine has been reapplying some limited pressure to
    Russian forces there.

  • The main axis of advance in southern Zaporizhzhia from Orikhiv.
    Ukrainian forces have been making advances through heavy
    fortifications and defenses, tunnels. First Russian line of defense
    was stronger than had been expected by open-source analysts; is main
    line of defense. Russia has been pressed back behind that main
    line, now trying to defend town of Verbove and moving to positions
    along second line.

  • Q: Is this a breakthrough? A penetration? A: In last few weeks,
    Ukrainian forces have picked up momentum. The extent to which they
    have been able to degrade Russian forces and Russian lines has had
    an effect. Both Ukraine and Russia making use of reserves; comes
    down to who is going to make better use of them. Ukrainian forces
    have had infantry push through first Russian line and are currently
    widening breach to secure against flank attacks. Probably not
    possible for Ukrainian forces to push south without taking town of
    Verbove, which would be on their flank. Russia has rotated in 76th
    airborne units, rotated out motor rifle units that had held areas.
    Probably best described as a breach. Not best described as a
    breakthrough, because that requires exploitation, ability to move
    vehicles through.

  • Q: Has offensive been successful? A: Narratives have been shifting.
    At first, was very pessimistic one, now some assessments seem more
    positive. Ukrainian approach has clearly achieved some results,
    however, Russian military does not seem to be pressured enough to be
    at risk of collapse. Russian military not that confident about
    being able to hold with units that they have. Many unknowns that we
    cannot see on battlefield. Main constraints on offensive are
    remaining combat strength and remaining artillery munitions, and
    weather. Weather may get worse around end of October or so. Not
    clear how long offensive will run; could continue into winter.
    Still too early to say result of offensive.

  • Q: How was your earlier piece, Perseverance and Adaptation: Ukraine’s Counteroffensive at Three Months
    received? A: Was received well. RUSI also put out piece same
    morning, Stormbreak: Fighting Through Russian Defences in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive,
    which came to similar conclusions despite not reviewing each other's
    works. RUSI report focused on Velyka Novosilka axis, Kofman and Lee
    focused on Orikhiv and Bakhmut. Similar conclusions on Russian
    adaptations and Ukrainian challenges, how action was conducted, how
    Western training needs to change. Similar ideas on what Ukrainian
    forces need. Kofman feels that this is about as much validation as
    can reasonably do, given the state of the war and information at
    this point.

  • Q: You proposed not bringing in new weapons so much as bringing in
    weapons already being brought in, faster and sooner. Could you
    expand on this? A: I focused on scaling up training, doing it
    sooner so there are more than 3-4 months. Need to line up with
    supporting capabilities and planning for future offensive starting
    sooner than was done for current offensive.

[continued in child]

[–] [email protected] 4 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago) (1 children)

[continued from parent]

  • Things to look at, ways to help Ukrainian forces maintain pressure
    on Russian forces going into winter. Possible that Ukrainian
    military will become exhausted, like last fall. Probably what
    Russian military anticipates, don't want to let Russia comfortably
    spend time digging in, reconstituting forces. Russia probably going
    to conduct another critical infrastructure strike campaign against
    Ukrainian cities, trying to make them uninhabitable, destroy viability as
    state. That means that air defense is going to become a priority
    again. Russia's strategic campaign did not succeed last year, but
    situation in December was somewhat-precarious. Ukrainian air
    defenses have gotten much better, gotten more equipment from West.
    Not clear whether this is going to be a cold or warm winter.
    Russian offensive potential remains weak in Kofman's view; without
    significant mobilization, have hard time to regenerate much
    offensive power. Should not discount possibility of additional
    Russian mobilization. Conversations on next year's offensive needs
    to start now; even if this offensive is successful, likely not to
    liberate extent of territory that Ukraine and western countries had
    hoped. Don't want to have a last-minute approach next year the way
    we did this year. Need to have commitments for equipment, etc, in
    September, not January. Training efforts are scaling up. Artillery
    ammunition probably going to be biggest constraint. One of biggest
    issues going to be coming up with enough both to let Ukraine sustain
    defenses and also to set aside enough to allow for offensives.
    Russia also increasing production, Russia trying to buy from North
    Korea, Iran. West needs to accept that this is going to be a long
    war and be willing to tolerate that; the opportunities for this to
    be a short war have passed. Russian forces could have collapsed
    last fall or Prighozin's mutinty have caused a coup or collapse, but
    those didn't happen. Can't know yet, but increasingly likely that
    Ukraine will not be able to decisively drive all the way to the
    coast in this offensive. Need to focus conversation on long-term
    outcome of war, long-term investments.

  • On Prighozin's death: Sounds like Prighozin's final mistake was
    coming back to challenge breakup of Wagner; not clear that he was
    always going to be killed, though Kofman would never have bet much
    on Putin's deal with Prighozin holding. Happy to see end of
    Prighozin; Western media tended to uncritically quote Prighozin,
    though he is not a reliable source. Wagner as an organization will
    probably continue in some form. Experienced fighters will stay
    around. Probably will be hard to fully replace Wagner, but we will
    see. Wagner may be back. Russian Ministry of Defense is requiring
    that people who want to fight in Ukraine need to take an oath. How
    important was Wagner? Was mostly fighting for Bakhmut, which wasn't
    really decisive in the conflict. Perhaps Wagner's main impact was
    in December or January last winter, when Russian military was very
    vulnerable and desperate to stabilize lines.

[–] slaughtermouse 3 points 1 year ago

Thanks for the synopsis!