Things to look at, ways to help Ukrainian forces maintain pressure
on Russian forces going into winter. Possible that Ukrainian
military will become exhausted, like last fall. Probably what
Russian military anticipates, don't want to let Russia comfortably
spend time digging in, reconstituting forces. Russia probably going
to conduct another critical infrastructure strike campaign against
Ukrainian cities, trying to make them uninhabitable, destroy viability as
state. That means that air defense is going to become a priority
again. Russia's strategic campaign did not succeed last year, but
situation in December was somewhat-precarious. Ukrainian air
defenses have gotten much better, gotten more equipment from West.
Not clear whether this is going to be a cold or warm winter.
Russian offensive potential remains weak in Kofman's view; without
significant mobilization, have hard time to regenerate much
offensive power. Should not discount possibility of additional
Russian mobilization. Conversations on next year's offensive needs
to start now; even if this offensive is successful, likely not to
liberate extent of territory that Ukraine and western countries had
hoped. Don't want to have a last-minute approach next year the way
we did this year. Need to have commitments for equipment, etc, in
September, not January. Training efforts are scaling up. Artillery
ammunition probably going to be biggest constraint. One of biggest
issues going to be coming up with enough both to let Ukraine sustain
defenses and also to set aside enough to allow for offensives.
Russia also increasing production, Russia trying to buy from North
Korea, Iran. West needs to accept that this is going to be a long
war and be willing to tolerate that; the opportunities for this to
be a short war have passed. Russian forces could have collapsed
last fall or Prighozin's mutinty have caused a coup or collapse, but
those didn't happen. Can't know yet, but increasingly likely that
Ukraine will not be able to decisively drive all the way to the
coast in this offensive. Need to focus conversation on long-term
outcome of war, long-term investments.
On Prighozin's death: Sounds like Prighozin's final mistake was
coming back to challenge breakup of Wagner; not clear that he was
always going to be killed, though Kofman would never have bet much
on Putin's deal with Prighozin holding. Happy to see end of
Prighozin; Western media tended to uncritically quote Prighozin,
though he is not a reliable source. Wagner as an organization will
probably continue in some form. Experienced fighters will stay
around. Probably will be hard to fully replace Wagner, but we will
see. Wagner may be back. Russian Ministry of Defense is requiring
that people who want to fight in Ukraine need to take an oath. How
important was Wagner? Was mostly fighting for Bakhmut, which wasn't
really decisive in the conflict. Perhaps Wagner's main impact was
in December or January last winter, when Russian military was very
vulnerable and desperate to stabilize lines.
[continued from parent]
Things to look at, ways to help Ukrainian forces maintain pressure
on Russian forces going into winter. Possible that Ukrainian
military will become exhausted, like last fall. Probably what
Russian military anticipates, don't want to let Russia comfortably
spend time digging in, reconstituting forces. Russia probably going
to conduct another critical infrastructure strike campaign against
Ukrainian cities, trying to make them uninhabitable, destroy viability as
state. That means that air defense is going to become a priority
again. Russia's strategic campaign did not succeed last year, but
situation in December was somewhat-precarious. Ukrainian air
defenses have gotten much better, gotten more equipment from West.
Not clear whether this is going to be a cold or warm winter.
Russian offensive potential remains weak in Kofman's view; without
significant mobilization, have hard time to regenerate much
offensive power. Should not discount possibility of additional
Russian mobilization. Conversations on next year's offensive needs
to start now; even if this offensive is successful, likely not to
liberate extent of territory that Ukraine and western countries had
hoped. Don't want to have a last-minute approach next year the way
we did this year. Need to have commitments for equipment, etc, in
September, not January. Training efforts are scaling up. Artillery
ammunition probably going to be biggest constraint. One of biggest
issues going to be coming up with enough both to let Ukraine sustain
defenses and also to set aside enough to allow for offensives.
Russia also increasing production, Russia trying to buy from North
Korea, Iran. West needs to accept that this is going to be a long
war and be willing to tolerate that; the opportunities for this to
be a short war have passed. Russian forces could have collapsed
last fall or Prighozin's mutinty have caused a coup or collapse, but
those didn't happen. Can't know yet, but increasingly likely that
Ukraine will not be able to decisively drive all the way to the
coast in this offensive. Need to focus conversation on long-term
outcome of war, long-term investments.
On Prighozin's death: Sounds like Prighozin's final mistake was
coming back to challenge breakup of Wagner; not clear that he was
always going to be killed, though Kofman would never have bet much
on Putin's deal with Prighozin holding. Happy to see end of
Prighozin; Western media tended to uncritically quote Prighozin,
though he is not a reliable source. Wagner as an organization will
probably continue in some form. Experienced fighters will stay
around. Probably will be hard to fully replace Wagner, but we will
see. Wagner may be back. Russian Ministry of Defense is requiring
that people who want to fight in Ukraine need to take an oath. How
important was Wagner? Was mostly fighting for Bakhmut, which wasn't
really decisive in the conflict. Perhaps Wagner's main impact was
in December or January last winter, when Russian military was very
vulnerable and desperate to stabilize lines.
Thanks for the synopsis!