this post was submitted on 06 Feb 2024
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What are the most paranoid network/OS security measures you've implemented in your homelab? (self.selfhosted)
submitted 10 months ago by MigratingtoLemmy to c/selfhosted
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As the title says, I want to know the most paranoid security measures you've implemented in your homelab. I can think of SDN solutions with firewalls covering every interface, ACLs, locked-down/hardened OSes etc but not much beyond that. I'm wondering how deep this paranoia can go (and maybe even go down my own route too!).

Thanks!

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[–] [email protected] 11 points 10 months ago* (last edited 10 months ago) (1 children)

I'm not super paranoid about security, but I do try to have a few good practices to make sure that it takes more than a bot scanning for /admin.php to find a way in.

  • Anything with SSH access uses key-based auth with password auth disabled. First thing I do when spinning up a new machine
  • Almost nothing is exposed directly to the Internet. I have wireguard set up on all my devices for remote access and also for extra security on public networks
  • Anyone who comes to visit gets put on the "guest" network, which is a separate subnet that can't see or talk to anything on the main network
  • For any service that supports creating multiple logins, I make sure I have a separate admin user with elevated permissions, and then create a non-privileged user that I sign in on other devices with
  • Every web-based service is only accessible with a FQDN which auto-redirects to HTTPS and has an actual certificate signed by a trusted CA. This is probably the most "paranoid" thing I do, because of the aforementioned not being accessible on the Internet, but it makes me happy to see the little lock symbol on my browser without having to fiddle around with trusting a self-signed cert.
[–] MigratingtoLemmy 3 points 10 months ago (1 children)

Every web-based service is only accessible with a FQDN which auto-redirects to HTTPS and has an actual certificate signed by a trusted CA

I'm assuming this is in your internal network. The problem with this is that communication from the client to the reverse-proxy (unless you're running a reverse-proxy sandboxed with each application/are directly decrypting traffic at the base of your application) is encrypted, but the traffic from the server to the reverse-proxy is not.

[–] [email protected] 2 points 10 months ago (1 children)

Definitely a consideration. In my case, the vast majority of my services are running in docker on a single host box, including the reverse proxy itself (Traefik). That unencrypted traffic never goes out over a wire, so for now I'm not concerned.

[–] raldone01 2 points 10 months ago* (last edited 10 months ago)

Bonus points for creating lots and lots of networks grouping the databases together with only their respective containers.

ip a is a huge mess.