Asklemmy

43989 readers

1567 users here now

A loosely moderated place to ask open-ended questions

Search asklemmy 🔍

If your post meets the following criteria, it's welcome here!

Open-ended question
Not offensive: at this point, we do not have the bandwidth to moderate overtly political discussions. Assume best intent and be excellent to each other.
Not regarding using or support for Lemmy: context, see the list of support communities and tools for finding communities below
Not ad nauseam inducing: please make sure it is a question that would be new to most members
An actual topic of discussion

Looking for support?

Looking for a community?

Lemmyverse: community search
sub.rehab: maps old subreddits to fediverse options, marks official as such
[email protected]: a community for finding communities

~Icon~ ~by~ ~@Double_[email protected]~

founded 5 years ago

MODERATORS

[email protected]

Can you steal a user's identity if you gain their old domain name? (self.asklemmy)

submitted 1 year ago by maggoats to c/[email protected]

28 comments fedilink hide all child comments

Just a random thought experiment. Let's say I have my account on a lemmy instance: [email protected]. One day I decide to stop paying for the domain and move to [email protected], and someone else gains it and also starts up a lemmy instance.

If they make their own [email protected], how do federated instances distinguish who's who?

Have I misunderstood the role of domain names in this?

you are viewing a single comment's thread
view the rest of the comments

[–] [email protected] 1 points 1 year ago (1 children)

You still don't seem to grasp the issue I'm pointing to.

You have instance 1, lemmy.whatever, this instance federated content to lemmy.ml. So now lemmy.ml holds content from lemmy.whatever.

Instance 1 gets nuked. Either because someone stole the domain, or the admin simply lost the private keys and had no backup. Or they had a backup but it's old and half their users got lost. A new Lemmy instance gets set up on lemmy.whatever (with a new key obviously). This is Instance 2.

Now lemmy.whatever starts federating content to lemmy.ml, but from instance 2.

How do you differentiate content and users from instance 1 and instance 2? It's the same domain, but different instances as the keys don't match. Do you block instance 2? Do you delete everything from instance 1 and now instance 2 is the "true" instance for the domain lemmy.whatever? Do you mark all new content from instance 2 as "unverified"?

Sure, with private keys in place a user [email protected] from instance 2 can't modify content from the instance 1 user [email protected]. But the instance 2 user could create new content under the name of the old user. How is this federated? Do other instances show the guy as test(2)@lemmy.whatever because the keys don't match?

[–] [email protected] 1 points 1 year ago (1 children)

You have instance

Let's stop it here. Instances are completely irrelevant in my idea.

but different instances as the keys don’t match

*sigh* The keys are in the Actor objects and in the Action objects and not in the instance. You cannot validate any instance, you cannot validate if an action was performed on a specific instance. You cannot prevent actors of the same name after the previous instance was wiped.

All you can do is validating if an action was performed by an actor existing at the time the action was perfoed and that both were signed with a specific key.

[–] [email protected] 1 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago) (1 children)

So the only things you secure are access to existing posts, comments and roles, but without any further checks if this is still the same user, correct?

So if [email protected] creates 10 posts, 100 comments and is the moderator of 5 communities (on other instances) then the public key would secure that only that user can interact with that data. Makes sense.

But now the domain gets stolen, a new Lemmy instance is set up, a new [email protected] is set up. This user is named [email protected], exactly the same as the original one. They just don't have the right key to interact with their old content.

Now that user wants to moderate one of those communities again, are they treated like a different user (because keys don't match)? Or just locked out (because you can't have two users with the same name as moderator for the community)? Your whole idea makes sense, but when it comes to enforcing those ideas you run into a dozen issues both for federation and when it comes to present the data in the UI.

And you get phishing issues on top. If they are treated as separate users by other instances, they could just write another legitimate moderator "Hey, it's me, [email protected]. I got accidentally kicked out of the community, can you re-invite me as moderator please?" so all the work you put in for security is for naught.

[–] [email protected] 1 points 1 year ago

So the only things you secure are access to existing posts,

The only thing I secure is that for a given Action by a given Actor it can be validated that those were signed with a given key.

So if [email protected] creates 10 posts, 100 comments and is the moderator of 5 communities (on other instances) then the public key would secure that only that user can interact with that data.

Everyone can interact with that data, but since those are signed with a specific key the sign would become invalidated.

Now that user wants to moderate one of those communities again, are they treated like a different user (because keys don’t match)?

Since the key and signature are just additional attributes of the Actor object they'll be the same user federation-wise. An instance admin needs to manually validate why the Actor uses a different key now. If the Actor is used to perform malicious things it can be verified that those things are done with a different key. What's done with this information is up to the instance admins.

If they are treated as separate users by other instances, they could just write another legitimate moderator

Exactly. Key signing does not prevent social engineering.