boonana

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 14.07.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 236590 (+550) people were liquidated,
• tanks - 4097 (+5) units
• APVs - 8008 (+9) units
• artillery systems - 4449 (+24) units,
• MLRS - 680 (+2) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 423 (+2) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 310 (+0) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 3783 (+31),
• cruise missiles - 1273 (+2),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 7019 (+24) units,
• special equipment - 662 (+10).

In June 2023, there have been several reports of Russian forces using antiquated armoured vehicles packed with several tonnes of explosives as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). The crew likely bail out of the vehicle after setting it on its course.

Most Russian VBIED cases have been reported around Marinka, near Donetsk city, and started days after Chechen units reinforced the area: there is a realistic possibility that Chechen forces are pioneering the tactic.

There is a heritage of Chechen fighters being skilled in IED use, dating back to the Chechen Wars from the 1990s. Chechens fighting for Ukraine were also reported to have made similar VBIEDs in January 2023.

Most of Russia’s VBIEDs have almost certainly detonated before they reached their target through a combination of anti-tank mines and direct fire, bringing into question the viability of the capability.

However, these VBIEDs cause extremely large explosions, which are still likely to have a psychological effect on defending forces.

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 13.07.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 236040 (+510) people were liquidated,
• tanks - 4092 (+2) units
• APVs - 7999 (+9) units
• artillery systems - 4425 (+23) units,
• MLRS - 678 (+4) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 421 (+6) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 310 (+0) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 3752 (+26),
• cruise missiles - 1271 (+0),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 6995 (+17) units
• special equipment - 652 (+5).

Data are being updated.

Moscow’s municipal authorities are highly likely threatening to withdraw contracts from construction firms if they fail to hit quotas for providing ‘volunteers’ to serve in Ukraine. One company has reportedly been set a target of 30 volunteers by the end of August 2023.

The move will likely primarily affect ethnic minorities from poorer regions of Russia such as Dagestan and central Asian states, who make up the majority of Moscow’s construction workers.

This measure is highly likely at least tacitly endorsed by Moscow mayor Sergey Sobyanin. It continues his track record of trying to minimise the impact of the conflict on better-off Muscovites, while still being seen to support the war effort.

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 11.07.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 235020 (+540) people were liquidated,
• tanks - 4089 (+4) units
• APVs - 7983 (+17) units
• artillery systems - 4385 (+14) units,
• MLRS - 672 (+4) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 414 (+0) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 310 (+1) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 3693 (+7),
• cruise missiles - 1271 (+0),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 6966 (+29) units
• special equipment - 640 (+8).

Russian state-approved media has responded to the 24 June 2023 Wagner Group mutiny in three phases. Outlets were almost certainly initially surprised by the mutiny and were not prepared; Russian TV maintained its usual schedule.

After the insurrection was defused, Russian state outlets sought to ‘correct’ claims that security forces had been passive. Narratives promoted the idea that President Vladimir Putin had triumphed by thwarting the insurrection, while avoiding bloodshed, and sought to unite the country behind the president.

Nearly a week later, the state started to play down the significance of Wagner owner Yevgeny Prigozhin and the mutiny, while tarnishing his character. Wagner Telegram channels have largely gone silent, almost certainly due to state intervention. By contrast, Putin has undertaken unusually prominent public engagements, almost certainly aiming to project strength.

What a shit show 🤡

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 09.07.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 234040 (+600) people were liquidated,
• tanks - 4078 (+4) units
• armored personnel carriers - 7964 (+11) units
• artillery systems - 4366 (+20) units,
• MLRS - 668 (+7) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 413 (+3) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 309 (+0) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 3685 (+19),
• cruise missiles - 1271 (+0),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 6929 (+15) units,
• special equipment - 628 (+9).

After a lull during June 2023, over the last seven days Bakhmut has again been the site of some of the most intense fighting along the front.

Ukrainian forces have made steady gains to both the north and south of the Russian-held town. Russian defenders are highly likely struggling with poor morale, a mix of disparate units and a limited ability to find and strike Ukrainian artillery.

The Russian leadership almost certainly see it as politically unacceptable to concede Bakhmut, which has a symbolic weight as one of the few Russian gains in the last 12 months. However, there are highly likely few additional reserves to commit to the sector.

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 08.07.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 233440 (+630) people were liquidated,
• tanks - 4074 (+4) units
• APVs - 7953 (+9) units
• artillery systems - 4346 (+16) units,
• MLRS - 661 (+3) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 410 (+2) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 309 (+0) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 3666 (+14),
• cruise missiles - 1271 (+0),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 6914 (+16) units,
• special equipment - 619 (+7).

On 1 July 2023, the Russian Navy established a new Azov Naval District, headquartered in the occupied Ukrainian port city of Mariupol.

Subordinate to the Black Sea Fleet (BSF), the district will reportedly command eight warships including three modern, Karakurt class corvettes which can launch SS-N-30A Kalibr cruise missiles.

The Azov Sea is a vital maritime area for Russia because it links its inland waterways to international maritime routes. In the context of the war, it also offers an alternative military resupply option should Russia’s over-land routes to southern Ukraine be disrupted.

The Azov Naval District will likely focus on supporting logistical and counter-partisan tasks, freeing up the main BSF to concentrate on long range strike operations and projecting maritime power further abroad.

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 07.07.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 232810 (+510) people were liquidated,
• tanks - 4070 (+2) units
• APVs - 7944 (+12) units
• artillery systems - 4330 (+20) units,
• MLRS - 658 (+1) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 408 (+4) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 309 (+0) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 3652 (+17),
• cruise missiles - 1271 (+7),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 6898 (+10) units,
• special equipment - 612 (+7).