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The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 21.07.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 240690 (+680) people were killed,
• tanks - 4133 (+4) units
• armored personnel carriers - 8080 (+15) units
• artillery systems - 4610 (+18) units,
• MLRS - 692 (+0) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 440 (+7) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 310 (+0) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 3933 (+15),
• cruise missiles - 1298 (+5),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 7145 (+11) units,
• special equipment - 686 (+1).

Data are being updated.

On 17 July 2023, Russia failed to renew its involvement in the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). This effectively nullified the security agreement which, despite the war, had ensured the safe passage of vessels exporting grain from Ukraine. Russia is aiming to deter all merchant shipping from Ukrainian ports.

Russia likely made the decision to leave some time ago because it decided that the deal was no longer serving its interests. Russia has masked this with disinformation, claiming its withdrawal is instead due to concerns that civilian ships are at risk from Ukrainian mines and that Ukraine was making military use of the grain corridor without providing evidence for these claims.

On 19 July 2023, the Russian MoD said it would assume all vessels approaching Ukraine were carrying weapons.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) will likely now take a more active role in disrupting any trade which continues. However, BSF blockade operations will be at risk from Ukrainian uncrewed surface vehicles and coastal defence cruise missiles.

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 20.07.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 240010 (+530) people were killed,
• tanks - 4129 (+6) units
• armored personnel carriers - 8065 (+6) units
• artillery systems - 4592 (+19) units,
• MLRS - 692 (+3) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 433 (+3) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 310 (+0) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 3918 (+33),
• cruise missiles - 1293 (+14),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 7134 (+29) units,
• special equipment - 685 (+2).

Data are being updated.

Since the start of July 2023, there has highly likely been an increase in fighting around the lower reaches of the Dnipro River.

As well as intense combat on the eastern bank around the small Ukrainian bridgehead near the ruined Antonivsky Bridge, small units of Russian and Ukrainian troops have also been contesting islands in the Dnipro delta.

Both sides are using small, fast motorboats, and Ukraine has successfully used tactical one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles to destroy some Russian boats.

Russia faces a dilemma in deciding whether to respond to these threats by strengthening its Dnipro Group of Forces at the expense of the stretched units facing the Ukrainian counter-offensive in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 19.07.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 239480 (+470) people were killed,
• tanks - 4123 (+4) units
• armored personnel carriers - 8059 (+8) units
• artillery systems - 4573 (+31) units,
• MLRS - 689 (+0) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 430 (+2) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 310 (+0) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 3885 (+46),
• cruise missiles - 1279 (+6),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 7105 (+19) units
• special equipment - 683 (+6).

Data are being updated.

Over the last week, fighting has continued in multiple sectors of the front, with both sides achieving marginal advances in different areas.

In the north-east, Russian forces have attempted to push west through forests west of Kremina. Ukraine continues to resource significant effort around Russian-held Bakhmut. Here Russian forces are likely fragile but holding for now. Further south in Donetsk Oblast, especially around Avdiivka, Russian forces continue to attempt local assaults, with little success.

In the south, Ukraine continues to attack on at least two axes, but is unlikely to have yet broken into Russia’s primary defensive lines. In this area, Russia has likely implemented a shell-rationing regime for artillery in an attempt to preserve its critical indirect fire capability. In Kherson Oblast, Ukraine maintains a small bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnipro River near the ruined Antonivsky Bridge which is an added challenge for Russian commanders who are likely concerned about the vulnerability of their south-western flank.

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 18.07.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 239010 (+710) people were liquidated,
• tanks - 4119 (+4) units
• armored personnel carriers - 8051 (+17) units
• artillery systems - 4542 (+38) units,
• MLRS - 689 (+4) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 428 (+0) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 310 (+0) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 3839 (+11),
• cruise missiles - 1273 (+0),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 7086 (+27) units,
• special equipment - 677 (+0). Data are being updated.

After being sacked as commander of Russia’s 58th Combined Arms Army (58 CAA) in Ukraine, General-Major Ivan Popov claimed that one of his key complaints had been about the lack of counter battery provision.

Russian ground forces survivability relies on effectively detecting Ukrainian artillery and striking against it, often with its force’s own artillery. A key component of this approach is counter-battery radars, which allow commanders to rapidly locate enemy gun lines.

Russia is suffering from a worsening shortage of counter-battery radars, especially its modern ZOOPARK-1M. Only a handful of the originally deployed ZOOPARK fleet are likely to remain operational in Ukraine. Open-source footage showed another ZOOPARK being destroyed near the 58 CAA’s area in early July 2023. The priority Popov apparently gave to this problem highlights the continued centrality of artillery in the war.

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 17.07.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 238300 (+620) people were liquidated,
• tanks - 4115 (+8) units
• armored personnel carriers - 8034 (+8) units
• artillery systems - 4504 (+23) units,
• MLRS - 685 (+4) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 428 (+3) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 310 (+0) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 3828 (+8),
• cruise missiles - 1273 (+0),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 7059 (+15) units,
• special equipment - 677 (+11).

Data are being updated.

Russia has routinely sacked commanders since the start of the invasion of Ukraine, but the removal of the 58th Combined Arms Army’s General-Major Ivan Popov is notable, he was apparently dismissed for voicing concerns rather than for any alleged poor performance.

In a leaked video intended for his troops, Popov delivered a scathing attack on the Russian MoD leadership, whom he accused of, “hitting us from the rear, viciously beheading the Army at the most difficult and intense moment”.

Popov’s comments draw attention to serious disaffection many officers likely harbour towards the senior military leadership. The complaints largely echo those made by Wagner Group owner Yevgeny Prigozhin prior to his

Direct criticism from subordinates is likely to become an increasing problem for Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff General Gerasimov.

Total enemy combat losses from 02/24/22 to 07/15/23 amounted to approximately:

• Personnel - about 237180 (+590) people were eliminated
• tanks - 4102 (+5) units
• armored personnel carriers - 8019 (+11) units
• artillery systems - 4463 (+14) units,
• MLRS - 680 (+0) units,
• anti-aircraft/anti-aircraft systems - 425 (+2) units
• Aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 310 (+0) units,
• UAVs of operational and tactical level - 3807 (+24) units
• cruise missiles - 1273 (+0),
• Ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 7036 (+17) units,
• special equipment - 664 (+2) units.

On 12 July 2023, Russian state media reported that nuclear-powered submarines of Russia's Northern Fleet will not be taking part in the main Navy Day fleet review in St Petersburg on 30 July 2023.

Since the current Navy Day format was established in 2017, this would be the first year that no nuclear-powered submarines have been involved. The change is likely primarily due to allow for maintenance and to retain availability for operations and training.

There is also a realistic possibility that internal security concerns since Wagner Group’s attempted mutiny have contributed to the decision.