boonana

joined 2 years ago
 

Over the last two months, Russia has likely started forming up major new formations to add depth to its ground forces. These include the 25th Combined Arms Army.

Since its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has mainly deployed mobilised reservists to back-fill established formations, or as part of territorial defence infantry regiments. It has rarely established new, all-arms organisations such as combined arms armies which are designed to be a self-sufficient force. An exception to this was the 3rd Army Corps created in summer 2022, which has generally performed poorly.

Russia will likely deploy any new formation as a reserve force in Ukraine. However, in the longer term, Russia aspires to strengthen its forces facing NATO. Without a major new wave of mandatory mobilisation, Russia is unlikely to find enough new troops to resource even one new army.

 

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 02.08.23 were approximately:

  • personnel - about 247230 (+540) people were liquidated,
  • tanks - 4217 (+1) units
  • APVs - 8213 (+8) units
  • artillery systems - 4866 (+27) units,
  • MLRS - 700 (+1) units,
  • air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 463 (+1) units
  • aircraft - 315 (+0) units
  • helicopters - 311 (+0) units,
  • UAV operational-tactical level - 4042 (+15),
  • cruise missiles - 1347 (+0),
  • ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
  • vehicles and fuel tanks - 7349 (+25) units,
  • special equipment - 718 (+0).

Data are being updated.

 

In southern Ukraine, intense fighting continues to be focused in two sectors. South of Orikhiv, the focus of Ukrainian assaults have been against Russia’s 58th Combined Arms Army (58 CAA). 58 CAA is highly likely struggling with battle fatigue and attrition in forward deployed regiments which have been in intense combat for over eight weeks.

Further east, south of Velyka Novosilka, the defending Russian force is drawn from both the Eastern and Southern military districts, likely creating problems of co-ordination. Elements of the 5th Combined Army are likely to be under particular pressure, and probably also feel that they are long overdue for a rotation out of the front-line.

Across the south, common problems for Russian commanders are highly likely to include shortage of artillery ammunition, a lack of reserves and problems securing the flanks of units in the defence.

 

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 01.08.23 were approximately:

  • personnel - about 246690 (+500) people were liquidated,
  • tanks - 4216 (+5) units
  • APVs - 8205 (+17) units
  • artillery systems - 4839 (+23) units,
  • MLRS - 699 (+0) units,
  • air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 462 (+2) units
  • aircraft - 315 (+0) units
  • helicopters - 311 (+0) units,
  • UAV operational-tactical level - 4027 (+10),
  • cruise missiles - 1347 (+0),
  • ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
  • vehicles and fuel tanks - 7324 (+32) units,
  • special equipment - 718 (+3).

Data are being updated.

 

The Russian authorities are prioritizing amending legislation to allow more men to be rapidly drafted into the military. In mid-July 2023, the State Duma increased the maximum age of liability for conscription from 27 to 30, while retaining the current lower limit at 18. While conscripts are not currently deployed in Ukraine, extra draftees free-up professional and mobilised soldiers from other duties inside Russia.

On 24 July 2023, President Putin signed a bill which will gradually increase the upper age limit for those liable for call up as reservists: senior officers can now be mobilised up to 70. Reservists made up the Autumn 2022 ‘partial mobilisation’ and could provide a more immediate boost to the number available to fight in Ukraine.

The increased chance of being compelled to fight, drone attacks on Moscow, exceptional level of domestic repression, and the recent Wagner mutiny combine to highlight the Russian state’s failure to insulate the population from the war.

 

Approximately 300 tents and 200 vehicles were identified in Tsel, Belarus.

Tents and vehicle storage identified from satellite imagery captured on 19 July 2023.

Since mid-July 2023, at least several thousand Wagner troops have likely established themselves at a military camp at Tsel, in central Belarus. Imagery shows that since mid-July 2023, hundreds of vehicles have arrived at the previously mostly empty facility.

Separate reports suggest most of the visible vehicles are trucks and minibuses with few armoured combat vehicles.

It remains unclear what has happened to the heavy equipment Wagner used in Ukraine; there is a realistic possibility that it was forced to return these to the Russian military.

Wagner’s ability to secure heavy equipment and enablers such as air transport will be key factors in its future combat effectiveness.

 

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 30.07.23 were approximately:

  • personnel - about 245700 (+480) people were liquidated,
  • tanks - 4205 (+14) units
  • APVs - 8178 (+11) units
  • artillery systems - 4795 (+9) units,
  • MLRS - 698 (+0) units,
  • air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 459 (+1) units
  • aircraft - 315 (+0) units
  • helicopters - 311 (+0) units,
  • UAV operational-tactical level - 4011 (+4),
  • cruise missiles - 1347 (+0),
  • ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
  • vehicles and fuel tanks - 7275 (+28) units,
  • special equipment - 711 (+1).

Data are being updated.

 

The Russia-Africa Conference convened in St Petersburg on 27 July 2023, with 17 African heads of state attending, down from 43 at the last iteration. The event takes place ten days after Russia withdrew from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI).

The BSGI had allowed the export of 30 million tonnes of Ukrainian grain to Africa, providing essential nutrition to states including Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan. As well as the direct disruption of supplies, Russia’s blockade of Ukraine is also causing grain prices to rise.

The impact of the war in Ukraine will almost certainly compound food insecurity across Africa for at least the next two years.

 

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 28.07.23 were approximately:

  • personnel - about 244830 (+560) people were liquidated,
  • tanks - 4190 (+4) units
  • APVs - 8161 (+14) units
  • artillery systems - 4775 (+30) units,
  • MLRS - 698 (+0) units,
  • air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 458 (+1) units
  • aircraft - 315 (+0) units
  • helicopters - 311 (+0) units,
  • UAV operational-tactical level - 4007 (+11),
  • cruise missiles - 1347 (+0),
  • ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
  • vehicles and fuel tanks - 7240 (+11) units,
  • special equipment - 709 (+1).

Data are being updated.

 

As Ukrainian forces continue major offensive operations in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, one of the single most influential Russian weapon systems in the sector is the Ka-52 HOKUM attack helicopter. Russia has highly likely lost around forty Ka-52s since the invasion, but the type has also imposed a heavy cost on Ukraine.

In recent months, Russia has highly likely augmented the force in the south with at least a small number of brand new, Ka-52M variants: a heavily modified aircraft, informed by lessons from Russia’s experience in Syria. Evidence supporting the M variant’s use in Ukraine includes photos posted on social media of aircrew posing next to the new aircraft and thanking well-wishers for sending them morale items.

Another key improvement to the Ka-52 fleet is the integration of a new anti-tank missile, the LMUR, which has a range of approximately 15km. Ka-52 crews have been quick to exploit opportunities to launch these weapons beyond the range of Ukrainian air defences.

 

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 27.07.23 were approximately:

  • personnel - about 244270 (+590) people were liquidated,
  • tanks - 4186 (+9) units
  • APVs - 8147 (+11) units
  • artillery systems - 4745 (+18) units,
  • MLRS - 698 (+0) units,
  • air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 457 (+0) units
  • aircraft - 315 (+0) units
  • helicopters - 311 (+0) units,
  • UAV operational-tactical level - 3996 (+3),
  • cruise missiles - 1347 (+40),
  • ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
  • vehicles and fuel tanks - 7229 (+18) units,
  • special equipment - 708 (+0).

Data are being updated.

 
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