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On 4 August 2023, President Putin signed into law a measure which will allow Rosgvardia, the Russian National Guard, to be equipped with heavy weaponry.

A sprawling organisation of up to 200,000 frontline personnel, Rosgvardia was created in its modern form in 2016 and is led by Putin’s former bodyguard Viktor Zolotov. The decision to strengthen the force follows the abortive Wagner mutiny of June 2023.

Despite Zolotov’s claim that his force performed ‘excellently’ during the mutiny, there is no evidence that Rosgvardia carried out any effective action against Wagner: exactly the sort of internal security threat it was designed to repress. With Zolotov previously suggesting that heavy equipment should include artillery and attack helicopters, the move suggests that the Kremlin is doubling down on resourcing Rosgvardia as one of the key organisations to ensure regime security.

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 08.08.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 250800 (+560) people were liquidated,
• tanks - 4254 (+10) units
• armored personnel carriers - 8278 (+8) units
• artillery systems - 4996 (+19) units,
• MLRS - 709 (+0) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 468 (+1) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 312 (+1) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 4158 (+4),
• cruise missiles - 1377 (+0),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 7460 (+9) units,
• special equipment - 737 (+2).

Data are being updated.

The Russian Air Force continues to consistently deploy considerable resources in support of land operations in Ukraine, but without decisive operational effect.

Over the summer, Russian tactical combat aircraft have typically carried out over 100 sorties a day, but these are almost always restricted to operating over Russian-controlled territory due to the threat from Ukrainian air defences. Russia has attempted to overcome this issue by increasingly using basic free-fall bombs with range-extending glide attachments. Aircraft can release these many kilometres from their targets, but they have yet to demonstrate consistent accuracy.

At the start of Ukraine’s southern counter-offensive from June 2023, Russian attack helicopters proved effective. However, in recent weeks Russia appears to have been less able to generate effective tactical airpower in the south.

The annual celebrations of Russia’s Airborne Forces (VDV) Day on 2 August 2023 have been overshadowed by an apparently unsanctioned disclosure of the scope of the casualties the elite force has suffered in Ukraine.

In a recorded address for VDV Day, the VDV’s Commander-in-Chief General Colonel Mikhail Teplinsky said that 8500 paratroopers had been wounded and later returned to duty or had refused to leave the front line at all. The video was quickly deleted from the Russian MoD’s official channels. He did not comment on how many troops had been killed or were too seriously wounded to return to duty.

However, extrapolating Teplinksy’s figures endorses the assessment that at least 50 per cent of the 30,000 paratroopers who deployed to Ukraine in 2022 have been killed or wounded.

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 07.08.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 250240 (+540) people were liquidated,
• tanks - 4244 (+7) units
• armored personnel carriers - 8270 (+8) units
• artillery systems - 4977 (+12) units,
• MLRS - 709 (+4) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 467 (+1) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 311 (+0) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 4154 (+28),
• cruise missiles - 1377 (+18),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 7451 (+10) units
• special equipment - 735 (+1).

Data are being updated.

During the night of 3-4 August 2023, the Russian Navy landing ship Olenegorsky Gornyak almost certainly suffered serious damage after being struck while near the Black Sea Fleet’s (BSF) Novorossiysk base.

Images of the vessel listing at 30-40 degrees suggest that several watertight compartments were breached, or that the crew’s damage control efforts were ineffectual.

Routinely assigned to Russia’s Northern Fleet, the vessel has augmented the BSF since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and has often ferried military and civilian traffic between Russia and occupied Crimea when the Kerch Bridge has been disrupted due to attacks.

The 3600 tonne, 113 metre long Olenegorsky Gornyak represents the largest Russian naval vessel seriously damaged or destroyed since the sinking of the cruiser Moskva on 13 April 2022. This is a significant blow to the BSF, which previously relocated most of its units to Novorossiysk due to the high threat to Sevastopol.

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 05.08.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 249110 (+620) people were liquidated,
• tanks - 4232 (+4) units
• APVs - 8251 (+2) units
• artillery systems - 4943 (+32) units,
• MLRS - 704 (+0) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 466 (+0) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 311 (+0) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 4116 (+12),
• cruise missiles - 1347 (+0),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 7422 (+30) units,
• special equipment - 730 (+6).

Data are being updated.

In the last two weeks, Russia has conducted several waves of strikes against Ukrainian ports on the Danube River using Iranian-produced one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA UAVs). It is highly likely attempting to coerce international shipping into stopping trading via the ports.

OWA UAVs have struck targets as close as 200 metres from the Romanian border, suggesting that Russia has evolved its risk appetite for conducting strikes near NATO territory.

There is a realistic possibility that Russia is using OWA UAVs to strike this area in the belief they are less likely to risk escalation than cruise missiles: Russia likely considers them as acceptably accurate, and they have much smaller warheads than cruise missiles.

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 04.08.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 248490 (+640) people were liquidated,
• tanks - 4228 (+4) units
• armored personnel carriers - 8249 (+15) units
• artillery systems - 4911 (+19) units,
• MLRS - 704 (+0) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 466 (+1) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 311 (+0) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 4104 (+27),
• cruise missiles - 1347 (+0),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 7392 (+20) units
• special equipment - 724 (+3).

Data are being updated.

Undergrowth regrowing across the battlefields of southern Ukraine is likely one factor contributing to the generally slow progress of combat in the area.

The predominately arable land in the combat zone has now been left fallow for 18 months, with the return of weeds and shrubs accelerating under the warm, damp summer conditions. The extra cover helps camouflage Russian defensive positions and makes defensive mine fields harder to clear.

Although undergrowth can also provide cover for small stealthy infantry assaults, the net effect has been to make it harder for either side to make advances.

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 03.08.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 247850 (+620) people were liquidated,
• tanks - 4224 (+7) units
• varmored personnel carriers - 8234 (+21) units
• artillery systems - 4892 (+26) units,
• MLRS - 704 (+4) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 465 (+2) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 311 (+0) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 4077 (+35),
• cruise missiles - 1347 (+0),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 7372 (+23) units,
• special equipment - 721 (+3).

Data are being updated.

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