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Over the last week, there has been an uptick in small-scale combat along the banks of the lower reaches of the Dnipro River.

Ukrainian forces have worked to raid or set up small bridgeheads at new locations on the Russian-held east bank. This is in addition to expanding the bridgehead Ukraine has maintained near the ruined Antonivsky Bridge since June 2023. Some of these operations likely took advantage of a local Russian force rotation.

The combatants also continue to skirmish for control of small islands in the Dnipro estuary. Russian commanders face a dilemma of whether to strengthen this area or to deploy troops in the areas of Ukraine’s main counter-offensive operations, farther to the east.

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 14.08.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 254380 (+530) people were liquidated,
• tanks - 4306 (+8) units
• APVs - 8354 (+19) units
• artillery systems - 5099 (+27) units,
• MLRS - 714 (+1) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 479 (+2) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 313 (+0) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 4213 (+9),
• cruise missiles - 1379 (+0),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 7562 (+19) units,
• special equipment - 766 (+6).

Data are being updated.

The Wagner Group is likely moving towards a down-sizing and reconfiguration process, largely to save on staff salary expenses at a time of financial pressure.

Since the abortive mutiny of June 2023, the Russian state has acted against some other business interests of Wagner owner Yevgeny Prigozhin. There is a realistic possibility that the Kremlin no longer funds the group.

If the Russian state no longer pays Wagner, the second most plausible paymasters are the Belarusian authorities.

However, the sizable force would be a significant and potentially unwelcome drain on modest Belarusian resources.

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 13.08.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 253850 (+560) people were liquidated,
• tanks - 4298 (+3) units
• armored personnel carriers - 8335 (+11) units
• artillery systems - 5072 (+19) units,
• MLRS - 713 (+0) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 477 (+5) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 313 (+0) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 4204 (+3),
• cruise missiles - 1379 (+0),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 7543 (+20) units,
• special equipment - 760 (+1).

The figure of total enemy losses in cruise missiles has been updated to take into account reconnaissance and search activities - this is not the loss of a cruise missile by the occupiers yesterday!

Data are being updated.

Russia has likely redeployed airborne forces’ (VDV) units from the Kherson region to the heavily contested Orikiv sector in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The 58th Combined Arms Army (58 CAA) has been in combat facing Ukrainian assaults since 4 June 2023.

As early as 11 July 2023, the then commander of 58 CAA was sacked, likely partially because of his insistence that elements of his force needed to be relieved.

Reports suggest that the 70th and 71st Motor Rifle Regiments have faced particularly intense attrition and heavy combat on the front line. There is a realistic possibility that the arrival of VDV will finally allow elements of these regiments to be pulled out for rest and recovery. However, the redeployment will likely leave Russia’s defences near the east bank of the Dnipro River weaker, where they are increasingly harassed by Ukrainian amphibious raids.

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 12.08.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 253290 (+510) people were liquidated,
• tanks - 4295 (+5) units
• armored personnel carriers - 8324 (+6) units
• artillery systems - 5053 (+10) units,
• MLRS - 713 (+0) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 472 (+1) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 313 (+0) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 4201 (+4),
• cruise missiles - 1378 (+1),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 7523 (+12) units,
• special equipment - 759 (+3).

Data are being updated.

On 7 August 2023, the Belarussian Ministry of Defence announced that the 6th Separate Guards Mechanised Brigade (6 SGMB) would conduct an exercise in the Grodno area of north-western Belarus, near the Polish and Lithuanian borders.

The ministry said that the exercise intended to incorporate lessons learnt by the Russian military in Ukraine. There is a realistic possibility that the Belarussian troops will be joined by a small number of Wagner Group advisors acting in a training role.

These specific exercises are highly likely part of the Belarussian military’s routine training cycle. 6 SGMB’s home garrison is in Grodno, and it is unlikely that the formation is currently deployed with the enablers it would need to make it combat-ready. However, Russia is almost certainly keen to promote Belarussian forces as posturing against NATO.

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 11.08.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 252780 (+580) people were liquidated,
• tanks - 4290 (+12) units
• armored personnel carriers - 8318 (+15) units
• artillery systems - 5043 (+15) units,
• MLRS - 713 (+2) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 471 (+2) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 313 (+0) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 4197 (+18),
• cruise missiles - 1377 (+0),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 7511 (+16) units
• special equipment - 756 (+10).

Data are being updated.

Over the last week, the Russian authorities have likely increased their ongoing efforts to disrupt Russian citizens’ access to Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Reports suggest many of the most popular VPNs have become unusable in some regions of Russia.

VPNs allow users to obfuscate their access to the internet, to maintain privacy and to bypass state-imposed censorship. VPNs are hugely popular in Russia, despite being illegal since 2017. They allow users to access objective international news sources, including about the war in Ukraine.

VPNs likely represent the greatest single vulnerability within the Russian state’s attempts at pervasive domestic information control. As well as increased technical disruption, the Russian state has also launched a public information campaign, attempting to scare citizens into avoiding VPNs by claiming they put their personal data at risk.

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 10.08.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 252200 (+580) people were liquidated,
• tanks - 4278 (+16) units
• APVs - 8303 (+13) units
• artillery systems - 5028 (+15) units,
• MLRS - 711 (+0) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 469 (+0) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 313 (+1) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 4179 (+4),
• cruise missiles - 1377 (+0),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 7495 (+16) units,
• special equipment - 746 (+4).

Data are being updated.

On 4 August 2023, the Russian merchant tanker (MT) Sig was attacked and disabled near the Kerch Strait, apparently by an Uncrewed Surface Vessel (USV). This came a day after a similar attack on the Olenegorsky Gornyak landing ship, and two days after an apparently foiled attack on Russian patrol boats while they were likely escorting the Russian merchant vessel (MV) Sparta IV.

Although civilian-flagged, MT Sig and MV Sparta IV have long been contracted to ship fuel and military supplies between Russia and Syria. Since 28 February 2022, Russian military ships have not been able to pass through the Bosphorus, leaving Russian military forces in Syria and the Mediterranean heavily dependent upon Sig, Sparta IV, and a handful of other civilian vessels.

The attacks show that USV operations are increasingly a major component of modern naval warfare and can be turned against the weakest links of Russia's sea supply lanes.

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.22 to 09.08.23 were approximately:

• personnel - about 251620 (+820) people were liquidated,
• tanks - 4262 (+8) units
• armored personnel carriers - 8290 (+12) units
• artillery systems - 5013 (+17) units,
• MLRS - 711 (+2) units,
• air defense systems / Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 469 (+1) units
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units
• helicopters - 312 (+0) units,
• UAV operational-tactical level - 4175 (+17),
• cruise missiles - 1377 (+0),
• ships / boats / warships / boats - 18 (+0) units,
• vehicles and fuel tanks - 7479 (+19) units,
• special equipment - 742 (+5).

Data are being updated.